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Summary 
Access control in distributed systems is a complex 
problem that can be tackled in several ways. The XACML 
standard provides a possible solution, with several benefits 
and some drawbacks. In this paper we investigate the 
concepts behind distributed access control, review the 
XACML standard, and provide practical suggestions about 
the components to be used in building a XACML-based 
distributed access control system.  
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1. Introduction 
Access control is the ability to permit or deny to a specific 
subject the use of a resource.  
In a general scenario the access control process is managed 
by an authorization system (AS) that takes decisions 
according to some authorization policies. 
An authorization policy consists of a set of 4-tuples 
(s,r,a,c) stating that the subject s is allowed to perform the 
action a on resource r if the set of condition c evaluates to 
true. The set of actions a subject is allowed to perform on a 
resource are called privileges. 
Authorization policies are implemented on resources by 
ACA (access control agents). An ACA sends to the AS a 
request as a triple (s,r,a) asking if the subject s owns the 
necessary privileges to perform action a on resource r. For 
example, in the access request "Allow the finance manager 
to create a file in the invoice folder on the finance server," 
the subject is the "finance manager," the resource is the 
"invoice folder on the finance server," and the action is 
"create a file." 
In a traditional centralized computing architecture (based 
upon mainframe and terminals) the role of AS and ACA 
was mainly played by the operating system (OS). Multi-
user OS employ various security features (e.g. password-
based authentication, file-based Access Control List 
known as ACL) to identify users and to permit or deny 
actions. Additionally, the OS is able to log all the security 
relevant events. The assumption was that users interact 
with a centralized system through devices having no 
autonomous computational capability, being mere I/O 
devices (i.e. pure terminals). Therefore all actions are 
performed on the hardware controlled by the OS which is 
then able to maintain a complete and consistent view of 
the system’s state and to enforce privileges and restrictions. 
Nowadays this monolithic and centralized approach to 
access control is largely infeasible because modern 
computing paradigms heavily exploit the concept of 
distributed computing. We are surrounded by a growing 
number of interconnected entities having increasing 
computational power. Peer-to-peer protocols are gaining 
ground and already substituted the traditional client-server 
approach in various fields (e.g., bit torrent[1]). To better 
use resources, grid computing [2] split up programs into 
parts that run simultaneously on multiple computers 
communicating over a network Computers may also 
interact without human intervention, for example using the 
Web Service technology. Moreover, mobile software 
agents can choose to migrate between computers at any 
time during their execution [3]. It is therefore clear that the 
access control problem in distributed systems cannot be 
simply solved by the OS because there is no way to keep a 
complete and consistent view of the global state of the 
system. For this reason, many alternative access-control 
mechanisms for distributed systems have been proposed in 
the literature. The proliferation of independent solutions 
led researchers to concentrate on more general schemes 
and authorization frameworks (e.g., Akenti [4], Ponder [5], 
WS-Policy [6], PERMIS [7]). 
All these frameworks specify their own policy languages, 
enforcement technique, and data formats. It is evident that 
a common standardized method for access control and 
policy enforcement it absolutely needed to build 
interoperable distributed systems: first of all, because the 
administration of different systems may require the usage 
of various access control methods, and second because 
cooperation between different security domains (e.g., 
merging policies from two different interacting 
companies) would otherwise become a nightmare.  
XACML [8] (eXtensible Access Control Markup 
Language) is the standard proposed by OASIS (the 
Organization for the Advancement of Structured 
Information Standards) to simplify these problems. 
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XACML was designed to replace existing access control 
mechanisms. It makes possible a simple, flexible way to 
express and enforce access control policies in a variety of 
environments, using a single language. It has a number of 
advantages over other access control policy technologies. 
For instance, security administrators can describe an 
access-control policy once, without having to rewrite it 
several times in different application-specific languages. 
On the other hand, application developers don’t have to 
invent their own policy language and write code to support 
it because they can reuse existing standardized code. 
Theoretically, XACML is the definitive solution to access 
control problems in a distributed scenario. However its 
practical use opens several issues. In this paper we 
investigate the concepts behind distributed access control, 
review the XACML standard, and provide practical 
suggestions about the components to be used in building a 
XACML-based distributed access control system.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a 
clear overview of the XACML standard. After that, in 
Section 3 we present more in details the XACML entities 
interactions. Section 4 analyses some of the most 
interesting XACML implementations, looking towards 
their application to the web services and the Service 
Oriented Architecture (SOA) [9]. Section 5 presents the 
actual interoperability between XACML entities, 
highlighting the open issues that according our opinion, 
should be take into account to improve XACML. Section 6 
gives the conclusions. 
2. An overview of XACML 
XACML is an XML-based syntax that describes both a 
policy language to specify general access control 
requirements and request/response formats for the 
authorization process.  
It provides: 
• a way to base access control decisions on attributes of 
both a subject and a resource; 
• a mechanism for supporting multiple subjects who 
have multiple roles (addressed by the XACML profile 
for RBAC [10]); 
• a method to share policies in a distributed 
environment; 
• a way to separate policy definition from its 
implementation in the applications. 
Additionally XACML suggests a management architecture 
for the decision-making process. This architecture is 
described by a data-flow model based on the ITU 
Recommendation X.812 [11] and on the standard ISO/IEC 
10181-7 [12][13]. 
It is worth noting that while the formats are standard and 
defined by means of an XML Schema, the usage of 
proposed architecture is not mandatory and does not 
constitute a standard. 
In the next sections we will present basic properties of 
XACML language and architecture. 
 
2.1 The XACML Policy language 
 
The policy language model is composed of several 
hierarchical objects depicted in Figure 1. 
XACML policies are XML documents rooted in a Policy 
or PolicySet element. A PolicySet is a container that can 
hold other Policy or PolicySet instances. 
A Policy represents a single access control object, 
expressed through a set of Rule elements. 
A Rule is composed by one Target, one or more 
Conditions and an Effect. 
A Target is basically a set of simplified attribute values to 
uniquely identify Subject, Resource and Action. For 
example, a username, their group membership, the file 
they want to access, and the time of day are all attribute 
values. 
Policy and PolicySet may be associated to Target elements. 
The Target is used both to check the request applicability 
and to index the Rule, Policy and PolicySet. 
The Condition is an optional Boolean function used to 
further refine the applicability of the Rule. For example in 
the sentence “Only allow logins from 9am to 5pm” the 
conditions serves to indicate the [9am-5pm] interval in 
which access must be granted. 
Fig 1: XACML Policy Language.  
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The Effect indicates the rule-writer’s intended 
consequence of a “TRUE” evaluation for the Rule. Two 
values are allowed: Permit and Deny.  
Another element is the Obligation. It defines the 
requirements to be satisfied when allowing the requested 
Action. For example, a possible Obligation is to send an 
email to the administrator when the actual resource is 
accessed [14]. 
Additionally, the Policy contains a 
RuleCombiningAlgorithm field and the PolicySet contains 
PolicyCombiningAlgorithm field whose meaning is 
related to the decision process and will be explained in 
Section 2.4. 
 
2.2 General syntax of XACML request and response 
 
XACML also specifies the format used to convey an 
authorization request and related decision, i.e., the 
response. This format is called XACML Context; it is 
defined in a XML Schema (see Figure 2).  
A Request Context consists of a set of attributes associated 
with the requesting subjects, the resource acted upon, the 
action being performed and the environment.  
The Subject element specifies the entity making the access 
request. Resource element defines the resource to which 
the Subject has request access. Action element explains the 
action that the Subject wishes to perform on the resource 
(e.g., read, write or execute). 
The Environment element describes the resource 
environment (e.g., date, time, etc.). 
Subject, Resource, Action and Environment can contain 
multiple attribute values. 
A Response Context contains one or more Results. They 
are obtained from the evaluation of the decision Request 
against the policy. The Decision can be one of the 
following strings: Permit, Deny, Not Applicable (if no 
applicable policies or rules could be found), or 
Indeterminate (if some error occurred during policy 
evaluation process). The Status returns optional 
information to characterize the error. Response may also 
include Obligations, if they are defined in the Policy or 
PolicySet evaluated. 
 
2.3 The XACML high-level architecture 
 
The XACML architecture includes four key components: 
the PEP (Policy Enforcement Point), the PDP (Policy 
Decision Point), the PAP (Policy Administration Point) 
and the PIP (Policy Information Point).  
The PEP enforces access control by making decision 
requests and enforcing authorization decisions. 
The PDP evaluates the applicable policy and renders an 
authorization decision. 
The PAP creates security policies and stores them in an 
appropriate repository. 
The PIP serves as the source of attributes or data required 
for policy evaluation. It manages all the information 
related to subject, resource and environment.  
A simplified version of this model is depicted in Figure 3. 
The typical work flow includes the following steps: 
1. The PAP writes policies and policy sets and makes them 
available to the PDP.  
2. The access requester sends an access request to the PEP. 
It may include attribute values of the subjects, resource, 
and environment. 
3. The PEP constructs a standard XACML request Context 
and sends it to the PDP. 
4. The PDP asks for any additional Subject, Resource, and 
Environment attribute values from the PIP. 
5. The PIP obtains the requested attributes and returns 
them to the PDP. 
6. The PDP asks to the PAP for the policies according to 
the request’s target.  
7. The PAP returns the request policies.  
8. The PDP evaluates the related policy and returns the 
standard XACML Response Context to the PEP. 
9. The PEP enforces the authorization decision. 
 
2.4 Policy evaluation 
 
According to the previous work flow, the PEP sends the 
authorization request to the PDP using the XACML 
Context.  It should be composed almost exclusively of 
attribute values about Subject, Resource and Environment. 
The PEP is asking the PDP if a subject is allowed to 
Fig. 3: XACML architecture and work flow
Fig. 2: XACML Request/Response syntax 
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perform the specified action on the resource in the 
environment. 
Then, when a request arrives to the PDP, it first locates all 
the Policies that matches the Target (by means of the PAP), 
after that it compares, using some particular functions, 
attribute values in the Request Context against attribute 
values contained in the policy.  
When a policy is composed by a single Rule, the PDP take 
into account the Conditions defined in the actual Rule. If 
they evaluate to true, then the Rule’s Effect (Permit or 
Deny) is returned to the PEP (in the Decision element of 
the Response Context). If the Condition evaluates to false 
then the PDP returns to the PEP the value Not Applicable 
(in the Decision element of the Response Context).  
Otherwise if many Rule instances are contained in a Policy, 
PDP needs a method to reconcile the actions specified by 
all Rules. This is the meaning of Rule Combining 
Algorithm in the Policy element. 
Analogously, for PolicySet, the Policy Combining 
Algorithm defines a procedure for arriving at an 
authorization decision given the individual results of 
evaluation of a set of policies.  
In the XACML specification the standard combining 
algorithms defined are: Deny-overrides, Permit-overrides, 
First-applicable and Only-one-applicable. 
For instance, the "Only-one-applicable" policy combining 
algorithm only applies to Policy elements. The result of 
this combining algorithm ensures that one and only one 
Policy or PolicySet is applicable. 
If no Policy or PolicySet applies, then the result is "Not 
Applicable", but if more than one Policy or PolicySet is 
applicable, then the result is "Indeterminate" (see the 
XACML specification for further details). 
3. XACML entities interaction 
As we have seen the authorization process involves several 
entities (e.g., PDP, PEP, PAP and PIP) that must 
collaborate.  
Although the XACML specification clearly describes 
components, it does not strictly define the interactions 
among these entities. This allows administrators or 
developers to adapt the system entities according to their 
requirements.  
In the following sections we present more in details these 
entity interactions. 
3.1 PDP-PEP  
XACML does not define any mechanism for transmitting 
requests, responses, and attributes over a network. 
It addresses only a configuration where the PDP and PEP 
are on the same system.  
SAML (Security Assertion Markup Language), another 
OASIS standard [15], is traditionally used to this purpose. 
How to use SAML 2.0 to carry the XACML messages 
between the XACML actors is defined in the SAML 
profile for XACML [16]. 
According to the profile specifications there are two 
general elements used to manage the messages exchange: 
a Query (an extension of the SAML Request element) and 
a Statement (the response to the Query giving one or more 
results). 
For PEP-PDP interaction the profile defines both a type of 
query (for Requests) and a type of statement (for 
Response). They are XACMLAuthzDecisionQuery and 
XACMLAuthzDecisionStatement. 
XACMLAuthzDecisionQuery carries the XACML request 
that PEP sends to the PDP to request authorization 
decision.  
XACMLAuthzDecisionStatement (an extension of the 
SAML Statement element) carries the XACML Response 
message sent from the PDP to the PEP. 
When SAML is used, the PEP converts the XACML 
request into a XACMLAuthzDecisionQuery and sends it 
to the PDP. The PDP converts the SAML query into an 
XACML request and processes the request against the 
XACML policy. The XACML response is converted into a 
XACMLAuthzDecisionStatement and sent back to the 
PEP, which converts it back into an XACML response. 
SAML does not provide message confidentiality only 
message integrity. If data being transmitted are sensitive, it 
must be protected using SSL/TLS or WS-Security.  
Otherwise if the SAML protocol is being used without 
SSL/TLS, all SAML messages must be signed 
appropriately. 
3.2 PDP-PAP  
The XACML 2.0 Core Specification does not explicitly 
address how policies are made available to the PDP or 
controlled once they are available. 
However, a XACML 2.0 entity, referred to as a PAP is 
functionally defined as “a system entity that creates a 
Policy or PolicySet”. Additional references are contained 
within the XACML 2.0 Core Specification that explains 
the responsibilities of the PAP regarding such topics as 
composition of PolicySet and maintaining unique 
identifiers for Policy. 
Two possible mechanisms for policy administration 
between a PAP and PDP are available: (1) a SAML-based 
request-response protocol and (2) a simple SAML 
Assertion-based storage format. 
In the first case the PDP queries the PAP for policies using 
the mechanism described in [16]. This mechanism 
provides both a format to query a policy, and a format to 
carry the requested policy (an extension of SAML 
Statement). They are XACMLPolicyQuery and 
XACMLPolicyStatement. 
XACMLPolicyQuery is used for requesting policies from 
the PAP. The element is extension of SAML Request 
element. For example, this query can be used to retrieve 
policies specific to a certain Target. 
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XACMLPolicyStatement carries the policies requested 
from the PAP. 
In the second case a PAP may use a simple SAML 
Assertion-based storage format, for placing policies in a 
generic repository. It may be accessed directly by the PDP. 
3.3 PDP-PIP  
Attributes contained in a request is compared by PDP 
against attribute values in the appropriate policies (referred 
to the same request’s Target). 
If these attributes are not in the request, the PDP can ask 
them to the PIP. 
In the XACML specifications are defined two mechanisms 
to retrieve attribute values: the Attribute Designator used 
to retrieve attribute values from a request (e.g., by 
specifying the name, type, and issuer of attributes) and the 
Attribute Selector that allow the PDP to look for attribute 
values through an XPath [17] query. 
Using the Attribute Designator the PDP looks for that 
attribute value in the request, otherwise it use other source 
(e.g., LDAP directory) to retrieve the needed informations. 
This element contains a URN that identifies the attribute.  
There are four kinds of Attribute Designator, one for each 
type of attributes in a request: Subject, Resource, Action, 
and Environment.  
Additionally attributes can be divided into different 
categories. For example to support the notion of multiple 
subjects making a request, subject attributes are 
categorized (e.g., the user, the user's workstation, the user's 
network, etc.). Then Subject Attribute Designators can 
also specify a category to look in.  
Otherwise the Attribute Selectors, through an XPath 
expression, can be used to resolve some set of attribute 
values in the request Context or in other location (e.g., a 
XML database). 
Since the Attribute Designator and the Attribute Selector 
can return multiple values, XACML provides a special 
attribute type called a Bag.  
Bags are unsorted value collections that allow duplicates, 
and are exclusively used by the PDP. It manages Bags by 
means of a set of ad hoc functions. If no matches are made, 
an empty bag is returned. 
As an alternative to the XACML native methods, SAML 
Query and Statement extensions can also be used. They 
are AttributeQuery and AttributeStatement. 
AttributeQuery (a standard SAML Request) may be used 
by the PIP to request attributes from Attribute Repositories 
(e.g. LDAP, etc). For example, this query can be used to 
retrieve administrator’s email address. 
AttributeStatement is the response to the attribute query 
that can contains one or more values. 
4. XACML in action 
In order to use XACML for access control in a web service 
scenario, all the described entities (PAP, PIP, PDP and 
PEP) must be available. The following subsections present 
available open source implementation and related issues. 
4.1 Policy Administration Point 
According to the XACML data-flow model, the first step 
to be accomplished is policy creation and storage by the 
PAP. 
Several tools have been developed to implement this 
functionality: UMU XACML policy editor [18]. XACML-
Studio (XS) [19]. Additionally, eXist, an open source 
native XML database, supports the creation of XACML 
policy [20] by means of a GUI.  
Once the policy has been written and stored, it is necessary 
to verify its correctness. To this purpose, policy 
verification tool are available. These tools are used to 
formally check general properties of access control 
policies.  
Examples of these tools are the ones developed by Hughes 
and Bultan [21] e by Fisler et al. [22]. 
Hughes and Bultan translate XACML policies to the Alloy 
language [23] and check their properties using the Alloy 
Analyzer. 
Fisler et al. developed an XACML policy verification tool 
called Margrave [24] that verifies user-specified properties 
and performs change-impact analysis.  
Additionally Zhang et al. [25] developed a model-
checking algorithm with a supporting tool to evaluate 
access control policies written in RW languages, which 
can be converted to XACML. 
These approaches support only a subset of the XACML 
policy specification language because it is challenging to 
generalize these verification approaches to support full 
featured XACML policies with complex conditions.  
Some of these approaches also require the user to specify a 
set of properties in some formal language to be verified; 
however, these formally specified properties often do not 
exist in practice.  
To avoid this problem E. Martin et al. [26] propose an 
approach for conducting conformance checking of 
XACML access control policies synthesizing first of all 
the concrete and desirable properties (from the policy 
under checking) and then feed the synthesized concrete 
properties to a policy verification tool or policy testing 
tools available. 
At the same time many researchers are working on the 
automatic generation of XACML policies from business 
process specification such as BPMN [27] and WS-CDL 
[28]. 
Wolter et al. [29] define a mapping between the XACML 
and the BPMN meta-models [30] to provide a model-
driven extraction of security policies from a business 
process model expressed in BPMN. The translation 
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process is done by means an XSLT converter that 
transforms modelled security constraints into XACML 
policies. Clearly correctness and completeness of 
authorization constraints must be verified into BPMN. 
In [31] Robinson et al. describe the idea to automatically 
derive the minimal authorizations required for the 
collaboration starting from WS-CDL specification. 
Additionally they aims at enabling and disabling 
authorization rules on in a just in time manner that 
matches the control flow. Nevertheless, they proved the 
effectiveness of their approach only in a well-defined 
collaborative scenario. 
Actually no “real” tools are available to automatically 
create XACML policies starting from business processes 
model, although some rough prototypes are available. 
Therefore despite the attempts to ease XACML policy 
creation, if you want to write your access control policies 
you’d better use a XACML policy editor, store them into a 
database and check them with a policy verification tool 
(e.g., the Margrave tool). 
4.2 Policy Decision Point 
The core of an access control architecture is the decision 
engine, called the PDP. We have therefore analysed the 
features and the performance of several available PDP 
implementations. 
Sun Microsystems Laboratories has provided an open 
source implementation of the XACML written in Java and 
available from SourceForge [32]. The most important 
feature is a set of API to manage the PDP lifecycle. The 
API supports basic PDP operations for parsing policies 
and request/response documents, for deciding about 
applicability of policies and for evaluating requests against 
policies. Additionally, the API provides methods to 
manage standard attribute types, functions and 
combination algorithms, and to add new functionalities 
(e.g., new mechanisms for retrieving policies from PAP 
and attributes from PIP).  
Based on this API, under the Apache License a PAP and a 
PDP have been implemented as web services that use 
Axis2. The project is called XACMLight [33]. It works 
theoretically in any J2EE compliant container but it was 
tested only on a native Axis2 server. 
Other XACML implementations are XACML.NET 0.7 
[34], Parthenon XACML policy engine [35], Enterprise-
java-XACML [36], Herasaf [37] and XEngine[38].  
We have exclude from our analysis Herasaf and XEngine 
because they are not available for testing.  
Our opinion is that it is not possible to highlight a generic 
“perfect” choice among the available implementation, 
because user requirements must be taken into account.  
The Parthenon Policy engine is the best choice if strict 
compliance to standard is a requirement, but since it is not 
an open source software, we exclude it from our 
classification. 
The Sun PDP fails in supporting just 3% of the XACML 
mandatory functionalities compared to XACML.NET 
implementation that fails in supporting 9% of the same 
ones [39]. 
Nevertheless the Sun implementation presents some 
shortcomings leading to non optimal performance:  
1) it does not have any cache mechanism for policy or 
evaluation result and this slows down the policy evaluation 
process; 
2) it simply matches any new request against each 
available policy and for this reason it is not appropriate if 
the number of policies increases. 
Starting from these considerations, it is clear that the two 
important stages in an XACML policy evaluation for 
performance analysis are: 
1. loading of policy/policies from disk to main memory; 
2. evaluation of request against the loaded policies. 
Turkmen et al. [40] created an experimental schema to test 
performance of any generic PDP implementation. To stay 
in close contact with the real world usage patterns for 
XACML, they created an experimental schema with 
different elements representing various usage scenarios. 
Each element provides a different view to the access 
control problem on diverse environments. Their policy test 
suite is: 
• large number of policies (over 1000); 
• large number of rules (over 1000 in a single policy); 
• 10 policies that have some similar rule inside. 
According to the authors’ results, Enterprise-java-XACML 
is the best choice in terms of policy evaluation time 
because it has many mechanisms for efficient policy 
evaluation such as target indexing and policy and result 
caching. In particular target indexing significantly speeds 
up the policy applicability search process for the given 
request. However it was the worst in policy loading.  
Otherwise XACMLight inherits from Sun’s 
implementation the problem in managing large number of 
policies.  
According to the authors’ results, XEngine is also an 
efficient policy evaluation engine. XEngine first converts a 
textual XACML policy to a numerical policy. Then it 
converts a numerical policy with complex structures to a 
numerical policy with a normalized structure. Finally, it 
converts the normalized numerical policy to tree data 
structures for efficient processing of requests. The 
experimental results show that XEngine is more efficient 
than the Sun PDP, and the performance difference grows 
almost linearly with the number of rules. 
4.3 Policy Information Point  
The PIP acts as source of attributes and in a web service 
scenario holds information about how to associate HTTP 
request attributes and sender information to XACML 
subject, resource and environment identifiers according to 
the XACML schema. 
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PIP can be built by using the Sun implementation via the 
com.sun.xacml.finder package that provides to the PDP 
support for retrieving attributes not already present in the 
request. It aims to resolve resource identifiers or to 
generate real-time values. 
4.4 Policy Enforcement Point 
The PEP is the entity that enforces PDP’s decisions. The 
main role of this agent is to be the interface between the 
managed application and the PDP. Hence, it translates the 
requests which are expressed in the application specific 
language into the standardized protocol language 
understood by the PDP. The PEP can also get additional 
information (attributes of subjects, resources and 
environments) from the PIP that will help the PDP to take 
its decision.  
Finally it translates the PDP’s decisions into the 
application specific language and enforces the decision. 
When using XACML in a Web service or Web application, 
PEP can be: 
1. embedded in the source code (Figure 5); 
2. placed as an additional module between the client 
and the web service container (e.g., Apache, JBoss) 
(Figure 6). 
In the first case the web service must be able to generate 
request and process answers according the XACML syntax 
for request/response as depicted in figure 5.  
Already most of the code that you need for building a PEP 
is provided by Sun’s implementation in the 
com.sun.xacml.ctx package (which represents the context 
schema). More details are available in the SUN’s 
Developer Guide. 
Otherwise, it is possible to use a module that intercepts the 
SOAP messages direct to and from the web service.  
The module can maintain the XACML Context and other 
information (e.g., the state). 
Laborde et al. [41] explain this idea. Their work is inspired 
by the Apache HTTP server. Apache provides a basic core 
HTTP server that can be enhanced by additional and 
configurable modules. In the same way, they propose a 
core PEP that calls additional modules to translate requests, 
get further information in different locations and 
translate/enforce PDP’s decisions. 
As an alternative the module can be implemented by 
means of a JAX-WS APIs as SOAP handler that 
implements the PEP functionality [42].  
Actually application independent PEPs are not available 
because it must consider web service related attributes.  
For usability, ease of maintainability and extensibility, we 
suggest to implement a PEP as separated module acting as 
SOAP message interceptor that can be integrate in a HTTP 
server. 
5. Actual PEP-PDP usage 
5.1 Interoperability 
XACML is an industry accepted standard that provides a 
well defined structure to create rules and policy sets to 
make complex authorization decisions.  
The actual interoperability between XACML entities from 
different vendors was demonstrated in two different times. 
The first-ever XACML interoperability demonstration was 
hosted at the Burton Group Catalyst Conference in June 
2007. The demonstration event occurred with eight 
vendors showcasing the results of their work.  
Fig. 4: PEP integrated in WS code 
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There were two particular use cases in this demo, which 
required interoperability between vendor implementations 
of PEP, PDP and PAP: (1) Authorization Decision and (2) 
Policy Exchange. 
Here we are interested in first case where four different 
scenarios were defined: (1) Customer Access, (2) 
Customer Transaction, (3) Account Manager Access and 
(4) Account Manager Approval. 
The Authorization Decision Interoperability Demo aimed 
to demonstrating that XACML version 2.0 requests 
generated by the PEP of Vendor A (PEP-A) are properly 
evaluated by the PDP of Vendor B (PDP-B), where 
Vendor A and Vendor B may be any of the vendors 
participating in the Interoperability Demo . 
At the RSA Conference 2008 in San Francisco, nine 
organizations came together to demonstrate, to the second 
time, interoperability simulating a real world scenario 
provided by the U.S Department of Veterans Affairs. 
Vendors showed how XACML obligations can provide 
capabilities in the policy decision making process. The use 
of XACML obligations with SAML was also highlighted. 
In looking at the two Interoperability Demo scenario 
documents [43] [44], it is clear that some specific choices 
were made to make the Demo work: 
1) Use of the SAML 2.0 Profile for XACML 2.0 which 
defines a Request/Response mechanism for Request and 
Response Context. 
2) Implementation of the XACML Interface of the PDP as 
a SOAP Interface which accepts a XACML authorisation 
decision query (by means of SAML syntax) and returns a 
XACML authorisation decision statement.  
5.2 Shortcomings in XACML 
XACML is just an access control policy language, thus it 
cannot be considered as a basis for a full authorization 
infrastructure. Even in the version 2 of the standard there 
are some deficiencies that must know and worked around:  
• It does not define how user credentials are validated 
(the specifications only talks about user attributes). 
• It does not specifies how policies are securely stored 
and retrieved; 
• It does not foresee integration with auditing 
mechanisms. In fact if XACML is used, it is hard to 
keep track of access rights of users or monitoring what 
a user can do in the system.  
• It does not say how environmental attributes are 
securely obtained; 
• It does not specify what an obligation is and how 
manage it. 
Additionally, current version of the standard does not 
cover the concept of delegation and specifically the 
delegation of policies, both in static and in dynamic way. 
A delegate is defined as “A person authorized to act as 
representative for another; a deputy or an agent”. 
Delegation of authority is the act of one user with a 
privilege giving it to another user (a delegate), in 
accordance with some delegation policy.  
The delegation concept is used to cater for the temporary 
transfer of access rights. However the ability of a user to 
delegate (or revoke) access rights to another must be 
tightly controlled by security policies. This requirement is 
critical in systems allowing cascaded delegation of access 
rights. A delegation policy permits subjects to grant 
privileges, which they possess (due to an existing 
authorization policy), to grantees to perform an action on 
Fig. 5: PEP as additional module 
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their behalf (e.g., passing read rights to a printer spooler in 
order to print a file). This last issue is directly addressed 
by the forthcoming XACML version 3. 
5.3 Open Issues. 
XACML provides a standard, flexible and fine-grained 
mechanism for defining and enforcing access controls 
across distributed systems but according to our opinion it 
is not mature yet. Still, many issues remain to be resolved 
before the emergence and adoption of XACML as stable 
standard. We propose and present a list of the open issue 
to improve XACML:  
1. standardizing the attribute values; 
2. standardizing the obligations that are returned, along 
with a protocol for talking to an Obligations Service; 
3. integration with other authorization frameworks that 
use different policy languages (e.g. EPAL [45], Ponder, 
PERMIS, P3P [46]). 
4. retrieving attributes from multiple sources; 
5. support for Sticky Policies1 [47]; 
6. building application independent PEPs and obligation 
services. 
6. Conclusion  
XACML provides a standard mechanism to satisfy 
interoperability requirements among the entities of an 
access control system. However, it does not address all the 
concepts that could be necessary to manage distributed 
access control system (e.g., delegation). Most likely it will 
be improved in its next version but for current use these 
shortcomings should be addressed in other ways. 
Several implementations of the basic XACML 
components are available. But our analysis showed that 
they are not equivalent in terms of functionality and 
performance. Therefore a careful selection should be 
performed before using them in a practical implementation. 
Despite these issues we conclude that XACML is ready for 
prime time access-control systems and will likely be the 
basis for several future improvements in this area. 
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